Cyber Risks · PortSwigger Research

Lab: HTTP/2 request splitting via CRLF injection

Summary: PortSwigger's lab demonstrates HTTP/2 request splitting via CRLF injection, where a front-end server downgrades HTTP/2 requests and fails to adequately sanitize incoming headers, leaving it vulnerable to request smuggling. The exercise uses response queue poisoning to capture an admin's post-login session cookie and reach the /admin panel, where the admin user logs in approximately every 10 seconds and the back-end connection resets every 10 requests.

Key Takeaway: A front-end that downgrades HTTP/2 without sanitizing headers lets an attacker poison the response queue and capture another user's session cookie - here the admin's 302 response - turning a protocol translation step into a path to the admin panel.

Read the original at PortSwigger Research ↗

Topics
Vulnerabilities & Patching
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