Cyber Risks · PortSwigger Research

Lab: Bypassing rate limits via race conditions

Summary: PortSwigger's lab shows a login rate limit that blocks an account after more than three failed attempts, enforced per-username rather than per-session, with the failed-attempt count stored server-side. Because a race window exists between the attempt check and the counter update, sending login requests in parallel lets more than three attempts through before the lock triggers, and a single-packet attack in Turbo Intruder then brute-forces the carlos account from a password list.

What you should know: A per-username lockout that only counts attempts after the fact is defeated by concurrency: if your login endpoint can be hit in parallel, the three-attempt ceiling is a suggestion, not a control.

Read the original at PortSwigger Research ↗

Topics
Vulnerabilities & Patching
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