Cyber Risks · PortSwigger Research

JWT none algorithm supported

Summary: PortSwigger Research describes a JWT vulnerability in which a server accepts tokens using the "none" algorithm, meaning it may accept tokens with no signature at all. Because the JWT header can be tampered with client-side, an attacker can set "alg" to "none", strip the signature, and if the server still accepts the token, supply an arbitrary payload claim such as changing "username": "joe" to "username": "admin" to escalate privileges or impersonate other users.

What you should know: A single accepted unsigned token lets an attacker rewrite their own identity claim to admin, so the exposure is full account takeover rather than a failed login. The source also warns that even applications not using unsecured JWTs must confirm their underlying parsing library restricts the "alg": "none" header.

Read the original at PortSwigger Research ↗

Topics
Vulnerabilities & Patching
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