Uncovering .NET Malware Obfuscated by Encryption and Virtualization
Summary: Unit 42 examined .NET malware samples that hide payloads in the PE overlay behind AES encryption in CBC mode, using a marker string (gXQstjDplQeg) to delimit the key, IV and ciphertext, with \x00-prefix and PAPADDINGXX suffix padding to evade signature-based detection. The second stage uses KoiVM, a ConfuserEx plugin, to wrap a dropper in a custom virtual machine whose opcodes may be remapped so tools like OldRod fail, and the final in-memory payload was mainly Agent Tesla or XWorm, with one FormBook/XLoader shellcode sample.
What you should know: Each layer is encrypted with strong AES and the final payload never touches disk, so a sandbox relying on static analysis sees only ciphertext and a VM interpreter - and the XWorm samples keep their AES key in a variable named Mutex, leaving C2 endpoints recoverable only after the dropper is hooked and run.
Read the original at Unit 42 Palo Alto Networks ↗
- Topics
- Detection & Response
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