Disclosing Shamir’s Secret Sharing vulnerabilities and announcing ZKDocs

Summary: Trail of Bits disclosed two bugs in the Shamir's Secret Sharing implementation of Binance's threshold signature scheme library (tss-lib) and most of its active forks that let a malicious user steal other users' secret keys or crash their nodes by configuring a malicious ID at the start of the key generation or resharing protocol. One bug stems from checking user IDs for non-zero without performing the check modulo the elliptic curve group order, and the other from failing to validate the modular inverse of (ID i – SelfID), which panics with a null dereference.
What you should know: Binance, Keep Network, Swingby, THORChain, and ZenGo X patched their implementations by December 20, 2021, but Clover had not replied to Trail of Bits' emails - leaving a known key-theft path open in a live threshold signature deployment.

Read the original at Trail of Bits Blog ↗