Trusted publishing: a new benchmark for packaging security
Summary: Trail of Bits worked with the Python Package Index over the past year to add trusted publishing, an authentication method built on OpenID Connect that removes long-lived API tokens and passwords from release workflows. The design binds a PyPI project to a specific OIDC identity - such as a GitHub Actions workflow in a named repository - and adds a claim tied to the user's stable ID so that an attacker who takes over a released username cannot publish.
What's compelling: A long-lived token stored in a GitHub Actions secret can be read by any step in the workflow, while trusted publishing's credentials live only a few minutes at a time - so an attacker caught mid-incident is sealed off without human intervention. The account resurrection case is the one to sit with: a project trusting hamilcar/cartago would otherwise start trusting an attacker the moment the original user renamed to hannibal.
Read the original at Trail of Bits Blog ↗
- Topics
- Supply Chain & AppSec
- Related
- Kitesurf is now open source Cyber Risks · Nov 13, 2026Trained to betray: How post-training supply chain attacks hijack coding agents Cyber Risks · Nov 12, 2026ZDI-26-913: (0Day) Meta fairseq load_audio_path Code Injection Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Cyber Risks · Nov 11, 2026