Cyber Risks · Trail of Bits Blog

A trail of flipping bits

Summary: Trail of Bits describes how the Forbidden attack on AES-GCM can be used against secure enclaves: because enclaves are stateless and cannot track nonce usage, an attacker can force enough signing-key encryptions to repeat a nonce, recover the AES-GCM hash key, and flip bits in stored ciphertext. Flipping bits in an encrypted ECDSA private key, or in Shamir's secret sharing shards that are recombined inside the enclave, lets the attacker recover the key bit by bit through signature verification against modified public keys.

Bottom line: The attacker here is the enclave operator itself, so the isolation and cryptography an organization relies on to keep signing keys out of the cloud provider's hands does not hold if AES-GCM nonce state cannot be maintained across power cycles.

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