Cloud cryptography demystified: Amazon Web Services
Summary: Trail of Bits published a guide to AWS cryptography services, splitting them into back-end services such as KMS and CloudHSM and client-side tools such as the AWS Encryption SDK, the AWS Database Encryption SDK, and the S3 Encryption Client. The post notes that KMS is intended for key-wrapping in an envelope encryption setup rather than encrypting large messages, that the Database Encryption SDK currently exists only for DynamoDB in Java, and that KMS external key stores should be used only where data sovereignty rules legally require them.
Bottom line: The guide states that KMS Encryption Context is logged in CloudTrail but not stored with the encrypted data, so teams working with KMS directly carry the burden of storing and managing it themselves. It also warns that Beacons truncated too short waste resources on false positives, while Beacons left too long let an attacker with access to the encrypted database infer relationships between plaintext values.
Read the original at Trail of Bits Blog ↗