Cyber Risks · Trail of Bits Blog

Quantum is unimportant to post-quantum

Summary: Trail of Bits argues that post-quantum cryptography's main benefit is not quantum resistance but safer, more resilient algorithms built on a diverse set of mathematical problems, developed with 40 years of hindsight about implementation failures. The post notes that current public-key crypto rests almost entirely on the hidden subgroup problem, that 664-bit RSA keys once called uncrackable now offer about 65 bits of security, and that RAINBOW and SIKE were broken during NIST's standardization effort.

Why it matters: The internet has put nearly all of its cryptographic eggs in one basket, and the source notes that keys considered fine in 1994 are laughable in 2024 - the break took 30 years and nobody noticed because key sizes kept growing. A single advance against the hidden subgroup problem, quantum or classical, would break the vast majority of public-key cryptography in use.

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