The cryptography behind electronic voting (and why paper ballots are still essential)

Summary: Trail of Bits explains that cryptography can keep individual votes secret and make tallies independently verifiable, as in the Helios and ElectionGuard protocols, but that it cannot replace paper ballots in general elections. The post cites the National Academy of Sciences' 2018 report concluding that electronic ballot return should not be used in general elections because no known technology guarantees the secrecy, security, and verifiability of a marked ballot transmitted over the Internet.
Key Takeaway: The post names a failure mode unique to electronic systems: a supply-chain or 0-day vulnerability that scales across many voting machines and jurisdictions could let one person single-handedly influence an election outcome, possibly while evading detection - a risk that paper records and physical controls sharply constrain.

Read the original at Trail of Bits Blog ↗