Indicators and ICS Network Defense
Summary: A Dragos blog post by Joe Slowik responds to criticism that his public reporting on the XENOTIME activity group and TRISIS malware omitted indicators of compromise. He argues that for operations personnel, sample hashes are effectively useless, and that the real question is whether an IOC-less approach leaves ICS defenders without actionable information.
What's compelling: The piece turns on a single claim: that omitting IOCs from a threat report may actively harm or disadvantage defenders. For ICS environments, where the author argues the IOC approach has known limits, that is the stake a security leader has to weigh.
Read the original at Dragos Blog ↗
- Topics
- OT / ICS & Critical Infrastructure
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