Why xOT Monitoring Matters: Lessons from an OT Threat Hunter
Summary: A Dragos OT threat hunter recounts a small electric utility that learned from the FBI, not its own staff, that its external IP was communicating with infrastructure tied to a state-sponsored group that had been in the environment for over 300 days. Within the first hour of reviewing the utility's network data, the hunter found two devices talking to known malicious IPs and scanning internally for OT devices, traffic that was never hidden but had never been looked for.
Key Takeaway: Three hundred days of undetected adversary presence versus one hour of visibility to find it is the gap between an organization that can see its extended OT environment and one that cannot, and the same blind spot drove Colonial Pipeline to shut down OT operations for six days over a ransomware incident that only touched IT.
Read the original at Dragos Blog ↗
- Topics
- OT / ICS & Critical Infrastructure
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