New TEE.Fail Side-Channel Attack Extracts Secrets from Intel and AMD DDR5 Secure Enclaves
Summary: Researchers from Georgia Tech, Purdue University, and Synkhronix developed TEE.Fail, a side-channel attack using an interposition device built from off-the-shelf electronics costing under $1,000 that inspects all memory traffic in a DDR5 server. The attack extracts cryptographic keys from Intel SGX and TDX and AMD SEV-SNP with Ciphertext Hiding, including attestation keys from fully updated machines in trusted status, and the researchers say extracted attestation keys can also compromise Nvidia GPU Confidential Computing.
Why it matters: The researchers found Intel and AMD's AES-XTS encryption mode is deterministic and insufficient against physical memory interposition, and both vendors said physical vector attacks are out of scope with no planned mitigations - so attestation that proves code ran in a confidential VM can be faked on current DDR5 hardware.
Read the original at The Hacker News ↗