Cyber Risks · The Hacker News

Where Multi-Factor Authentication Stops and Credential Abuse Starts

Summary: MFA enforced through cloud identity providers like Entra ID, Okta, or Google Workspace covers cloud apps and federated sign-ins, but Windows logons to domain-joined systems are validated by on-prem Active Directory via Kerberos or NTLM and never trigger an MFA prompt. An attacker holding a password or NTLM hash can authenticate to a domain-joined machine, use pass-the-hash against NTLM, steal or forge Kerberos tickets, and move laterally over SMB or RDP without meeting the MFA policies that protect SaaS apps.

Key Takeaway: Every Windows logon path outside your identity provider - direct workstation and server sign-ins, RDP sessions, SMB administrative shares, and non-expiring service accounts - is an authentication surface your MFA policy does not see, and a single stolen hash is enough to cross it.

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Topics
Identity & Access Management
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