WebRTC Skimmer Bypasses CSP to Steal Payment Data from E-Commerce Sites
Summary: Researchers at Sansec found a payment skimmer that uses WebRTC data channels instead of HTTP requests or image beacons to load its payload and exfiltrate stolen card data, deployed against a car maker's e-commerce site via a new Magento Open Source and Adobe Commerce flaw called PolyShell. The skimmer opens a WebRTC peer connection to the hard-coded IP 202.181.177[.]177 over UDP port 3479, retrieves JavaScript injected into the page, and runs over DTLS-encrypted UDP, which Sansec says bypasses Content Security Policy and evades HTTP-inspecting network tools.
Bottom line: Sansec found PolyShell attacks on 56.7% of all vulnerable stores, with more than 50 IP addresses scanning since March 19, 2026, and Adobe's fix shipped only in 2.4.9-beta1 on March 10, 2026, not in production versions. A strict CSP that blocks unauthorized HTTP connections does nothing against this exfiltration path.
Read the original at The Hacker News ↗
- Topics
- Supply Chain & AppSec
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