Welcome to the Jungle: What We Found Inside 15,465 Public MCP Servers

Summary: OX Security analyzed 15,465 publicly indexed MCP servers across 5 MCP registries, deduplicated to 5,095 unique hostnames, and found no guardrails and no review in the marketplaces where they are published. The researchers note that remote MCP servers can run backend code that differs entirely from what their public repository shows, and that an operator could launch a server on a clean US IP address and later route traffic somewhere else.
Bottom line: MCP connections often sit outside the data residency rules, Zero Trust boundaries, granular IAM, and supply chain audits that enterprises built over the past decade to adopt public cloud safely. Anyone can write a server, push it, and publish it, so until marketplaces add vetting, code signing, and origin verification, that work falls to the enterprise.

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