Triggering Miniflame's C&C Communication to Create a Pcap
Summary: Cisco Talos researchers found that Miniflame's .ocx components would not initiate command-and-control traffic when registered with Regsvr32, but did so after the ServiceDll registry key under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Nla\Parameters was pointed at the .ocx file and the machine was rebooted. The captured traffic showed a POST request to webupdate.hopto.org, one of the C&C servers named in Securelist's report, and the behavior was released as Snort SID 24406.
Key Takeaway: The same ServiceDll registry key that Miniflame abuses was previously a prerequisite for Conficker's network communication, so a single registry value can be the difference between a sample that looks dormant and one that calls home to webupdate.hopto.org.
Read the original at Cisco Talos ↗
- Topics
- Detection & Response
- Related
- YARA-X 1.23.0 Release, (Sun, Nov 15th) Cyber Risks · Nov 15, 2026Inside Falcon AI Gateway: One Control Point for AI Traffic Cyber Risks · Nov 13, 2026Macfinger Click Fix campaign sends Down TheDRAIN infostealer for macOS, (Fri, Nov 13th) Cyber Risks · Nov 13, 2026